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CODIE-D-111/1.7/7 18 July 1967

## UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

COMMETTEE ON DOCUMENTATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT: Report of CODIB Tack Term VII - Analyst Communication

REFERENCES: a. USIB-D-39.7/6, 6 May 1964 b. CODIB-D-111/1.7/5, 7 April 1967 (Attached)

#### A. Background

This is a report on the study undertaken by CODIB's Task Team VII, Analyst Communication, pursuant to USIB direction contained in Reference a. The task team was chaired by a representative of the Department of State with additional members from DIA and CLA. The objectives of the task team were to: (a) study present practices and procedures in the field of intelligence analyst-to-analyst communications to ascertain whether improvement is required; and, if required, to develop proposula to facilitate the exchange between analysts of substantive information and personal judgment and expertise, and (b) to determine the feasibility of establishing a centralized intelligence community directory service as an aid in any program of improvement. The study was confined to those components of USIE agencies in the Washington, D.C., area which produce current, basic or estimative finished intelligence. For practical reasons the team concentrated its study on one geographic area (viz., Latin America); however, the problems were discussed with a number of analysts in other geographic and functional areas. The team felt that the coverage was sufficiently broad to validate the views set forth in its report.

# B. Summary of Task Team Findings

The task team found that while the situation with respect to analyst-to-analyst communication was generally more satisfactory than had been presumed when the team was organized, there remains room for improvement. Analysts in one agency communicate with analysts in another agency for two major purposes: (a) to exchange views and judgments and (b) to obtain information. Such communication is not generally undertaken to svoid duplication of effort. Although present

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The tank team found no enthusiasm by analysts for a centralized directory service and concluded that it could not be justified because of the security problems involved, the cost and the difficulty of establishing and maintaining such a service. In lieu thereof, the team felt that increased access to listings of key personnel, organizational charts, and telephone directories of the various agencies would aid significantly in identifying and locating the appropriate analyst in another agency.

The task team believes that the use of closed circuit television techniques could be developed into a useful means of analyst-to-analyst communication capacially between photo interpreters and general analysts. The feasibility of these techniques has been demonstrated. However, application to real-life situations requires further effort which the task team recommends be undertaken.

The task team reports that there may be unprecedented progress in the field of secure communications in the ment few years. Therefore, it believes that continuous liaison is necessary between managers of major analysis activities and those responsible for planning and developing secure voice systems in order to take full advantage of new developments in terms of improved analyst-to-analyst communication capabilities.

### C. CODIB Comment

In view of the fact that the intelligence community is now housed in forty or more buildings in the Washington area, we believe that there is much to be gained by improving, through concerted community effort, the mechanisms by which analysts in one agency or building can make contact with analysts in another agency or building and discuss classified matters. The temptation is very great to use the insecure telephone, which is on virtually every analyst's deak, for discussion of classified matters, especially when the only alternative is a time-consuming personal visit to discuss a matter that would require only a short telephone conversation. We believe that the secure voice and other communications media available to analysts are far from satisfactory. We agree with the task team that the "green" phone system offers good prospects for immediate improvement.

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We have learned recently that a small, portable, relatively low-cost device (Magnafex 840 Faccimile Transceiver) is now available commercially and can be used in conjunction with a telephone to transmit either text or graphic materials at any security level for which the telephone is approved. We believe that use of devices of this type warrants consideration.

We agree with the task team, but not necessarily for the same reasons, that a directory service to assist in identifying and contacting S-E-C-R-E-R

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analysts is not varranted at this time. We feel that we should not place any greater temptation before the analysts than they now have to use the insecure phone system for classified conversations. We view with some classified reported by the task team that the insecure phone system is used widely and extensively to discuss this insecure phone system is used widely and extensively to remady the classified matters. Steps should be taken immediately to remady the condition which makes this practice a virtual necessity. We believe that the problem of a directory service should be examined again after there has been an improvement in the facilities for secure voice communication between analysts in different buildings. In the mean-time, the existing liaison staffs should be permitted to secure and have available such telephone directories, organizational charts, listings of key personnel and handbooks from the other agencies as are needed to assist those analysts when they serve in identifying and locating the appropriate analysts when they serve in identifying and locating the appropriate analysts and sources of information in the other agencies. In this regard we note that CIA no longer maintains a lighton officer at

We believe that there is considerable advantage to be gained from application of closed circuit television techniques to the analysis and communication of intelligence. However, we cannot foresee all of the gains with sufficient clarity at this time to varrant recommending priority effort.

We have learned since the task team completed its report that the Army Electronics Command, as executive agent for the Defence Communications Agency, has had an extensive and successful program underway to develop equipment and techniques for secure transmission underway to develop equipment and techniques for commerical TV. The prototype equipment and techniques have been developed and tested and are operationally satisfactory. The cost at the present time is rather high, on the order of \$1 million per pair of terminals. We have laked the Army Electronics Command and the Defense Communications Agency to keep us informed of further developments and/or plans for installation of any secure video systems. We will examine these to see whether they might be used or extended into appropriate areas to enhance analyst-to-analyst communications.

# D. Recommendations

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We recommend that USIB:

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alleviate as soon as possible the surrent situation in which the commercial telephone system is the only one available to a large percentage of the analysts.

- 2. Request the member agencies to assure continuing porticipation by managers of the major analysis organizations in the planning activities of those prople concerned with the development and installation of secure voice communications equipment and systems so that analyst-to-analyst communication sapabilities may be improved in the future to the maximum feasible extent.
- 3. Endorse the principle that the liaison staffs of the various agencies should be permitted to obtain and have available such telephone directories, organizational charts, listings of key personnel and handbooks as are needed to assist those analysts whom they serve in identifying appropriate analysts and sources of information in the other agencies.
  - 4. Note the attached report of CODIN Task Team VII.

Chairman	

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